Migrant workers at the forefront in Nepal elections

By Pramod Regmi and Edwin van Teijlingen

Since 2008, Nepal has issued approximately 7.6 million approvals for citizens seeking employment abroad. While foreign employment boosts both household incomes and the national economy, there are negative consequences on the health and well-being of migrant workers and their families. Nepalese migrant workers often do the high-risk “3Ds” jobs—difficult, dirty, and dangerous. These occupations carry increased risks of injury and death. A recent report by Nepal’s Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MoLESS) shows 13,223 migrant workers died abroad between 2008 and 2024. However, these figures are likely underestimated, as they only reflect cases for which financial support was provided to families. In addition, there are many undocumented workers who often lack access to health or social security protection abroad.

Labour migration from Nepal brings many risks. Prospective migrants frequently lack reliable information or support from government and civil society. Pre-departure health screenings and orientation programmes are mandatory, but poorly implemented, whilst emerging health issues remain largely unaddressed. Once abroad, workers often face exploitation and harsh working conditions. Female migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation including sexual violence and unintended pregnancies. Returnees who have experienced abuse may face social stigma and have limited opportunities to utilise the skills they acquired overseas, compounded by Nepal’s fragile economic landscape.

As the 2026 general election approaches, migration has emerged as a central political issue. Political parties have unveiled plans to safeguard migrants’ rights, reduce forced migration, and provide support for returnees.

The Nepali Congress (NC) promises to halve the number of outgoing migrant workers within five years; this proposal raises questions about feasibility. Nepal sees over 2,000 citizens leave daily for work abroad, driven by limited domestic employment. While NC’s comprehensive support program including pre-departure counselling, skills training, health checks, and diplomatic protection is commendable, the scale of implementation across rural districts may strain government capacity. Post-return incentives such as a “Gold Card” and remittance-linked projects could encourage returnee reintegration, but these measures depend on bureaucratic efficiency and financial sustainability. Critics also note that reducing migration without creating domestic alternatives could push workers into informal or undocumented channels, potentially increasing their vulnerability.

The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) emphasises regulating recruitment agencies and providing remittance protections. The RSP proposes special identity cards to those send remittances, which would grant access to subsidised government services. Aspiring migrants from disadvantaged communities will also receive affordable loans. The pledge to create 1.2 million domestic jobs is a bold. However, the government’s historical track record on job creation suggests that delivering millions of sustainable jobs within a few years will be a formidable challenge. While concessional loans and identity cards may benefit marginalised families, the real test lies in ensuring effective monitoring and transparency, especially in remote regions where access to services is limited.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML) proposes ambitious cash incentives for remittances, which could encourage formal remittance flows and reduce dependence on informal channels. The CPN-UML also proposes training and skill development for individuals seeking foreign employment and offering assistance to returnee, as well as to those planning to go, in starting enterprises based on the skills they have acquired. Through bilateral labour agreements with destination countries, the party aims to reduce labour exploitation, fraud, and gender-based violence abroad. Their focus on skills training and entrepreneurial support for returnees is pragmatic, addressing a gap where many returnees struggle to apply the skills gained abroad. Eliminating high-interest loans for foreign employment is a significant reform, but its success depends on financial sector cooperation and the enforcement of regulations. Strengthening workers’ rights abroad is essential; however, Nepal has limited leverage over labour conditions in host countries, making diplomatic support crucial.

Nepali Communist Party (NCP) aims to make foreign employment dignified and safe, focusing on skilled and semi-skilled workers with guaranteed wages. Coordinated returnee services including legal aid, financial literacy, and skill development are a positive step toward long-term reintegration. Proposals to extend voting rights abroad signal an effort to engage the diaspora politically, but practical implementation will require a better electoral infrastructure. Critics caution that prioritising skilled workers could neglect most Nepalese labour migrants, who work in lower-skilled sectors and remain highly vulnerable to exploitation.

Overall, the migration pledges reflect a growing political recognition of the risks and benefits of labour migration. The effectiveness of many of these pledges will depend on financial resources, bureaucratic capacity, and international cooperation. Without parallel strategies for domestic job creation, skills development, and enforcement of labour protections abroad, there is a risk that these initiatives remain aspirational rather than making a real difference.

Dr. Regmi and Prof. van Teijlingen are health researchers at Bournemouth University, UK, with an interest in the health and well-being of Nepalese migrants and their left-behind families.